I. STATUS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
There are two principal types of international law-treaties and customary international law. International human rights litigation has not primarily involved treaty claims. There are of course many treaties today that govern human rights, but the United States either has not ratified these treaties, or it has declared them to be non-self-executing-that is, not enforceable in US courts until implemented by Congress. Consequently, international human rights litigation in the United States is primarily based on claims under customary international law-the law that "results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation."
The text of the Constitution says little about the domestic status of customary international law. It says a number of things about the status of treaties-in particular, it tells us that they are part of the supreme law of the land and that federal courts may hear cases arising under them. 4 The only reference in the Constitution to customary international law, however, is a grant of statutory power to Congress to define and punish offenses against customary international law (referred to at the time of the founding as part of the 'law of nations"). 5 In several decisions in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court referred to the law of nations as "part of our law" or "part of the law of the land." 6 In practice, courts treated customary international law as general common law-a background source of law for federal and state courts in the absence of any federal or state legislation to the contrary. Federal court interpretations of this general common law were not binding on the state courts, and claims arising under this general common law did not fall within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts. 7 In Erie Railroad v Tompkins," the Supreme Court held that federal courts were no longer free to apply general common law-the choice was either federal law or state law. 9 On the same day it decided Erie, however, the Court held that for some issues it is appropriate for federal courts to create federal common law-common law that is truly federal in that it is binding on the states and provides a basis for federal question jurisdiction." 0 The Supreme Court has not had occasion since Erie to resolve the status of customary international law. There is dicta in the Supreme Court's Sabbatino decision" that could be read as endorsing a federal common law status for customary international law, 2 but that was not the holding of the Court; indeed, the Court in Sabbatino refused to apply in that case customary international law governing expropriation of foreign citizen property.
In 1980, however, the Second Circuit held in Filartiga that customary international law has the status of post-Erie federal common law. 3 As such, cases arising under customary international law, the court said, fell within the federal court jurisdiction allowed by Article III for cases "arising under ... the Laws of the United States."' 4 On that basis, the court held that it was constitutional for federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over tort claims based on customary international law even when the parties are not diverse. A number of other lower federal courts have since agreed with Filartiga on this point, and several of these courts have even described the proposition that customary international law has the status of federal common law as "settled." 16 This conclusion can be challenged on a number of grounds,' but that is not my focus here. My focus is instead on whether customary international law confers an individual right to sue in US courts, also known as a "private right of action." It is worth noting, however, that some of the arguments that have been made against federal common law status for customary international law-such as the argument that the federalization of such law is properly a task for the elected political branches rather than the courts, and the argument that the political branches have implicitly precluded such federalization in the human rights area by virtue of the limitations they have imposed on human rights treaties-turn out to be relevant to the private right of action issue as well. 9 he noted that according federal common law status to customary international law does not establish that, 'like the common law of contract and tort, for example... individuals [have] the right to ask for judicial relief "' For a variety of separation of powers and international law reasons, Bork argued that it was in fact inappropriate for courts to imply such a private cause of action under customary international law. Among other things, he noted that the political branches rather than the courts have principal responsibility for foreign relations issues, that the domestic implementation of international law is generally governed by domestic rather than international law, and that even the international law governing human rights does not generally purport to require private civil remedies.
Judge Bork's argument generated substantial concern in the human rights community, and it was heavily criticized by international law commentators. 2 ' There was sufficient concern about the argument that in 1991 Congress was persuaded to enact the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA").
2 By its terms, this statute creates a private right to sue in US courts for claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, subject to a statute of limitations, an exhaustion requirement, and other provisions. The legislative history of the statute makes clear that it was in part a response to Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren. 2 ' The TVPA covers only torture and extrajudicial killing committed under "actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation," and thus does not apply to actions by US officials. Importantly, however, its cause of action is available to both domestic and foreign plaintiffs. As noted in the legislative history, the TVPA was designed to provide "a dear and specific remedy, not limited to aliens, for torture and extrajudicial killing." 4 18. Consider Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § § 6.3.3, 9.1 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1999). 
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The TVPA does not apply to claims based on conduct other than torture or extrajudicial killing. As a result, the problem highlighted by Judge Bork is still relevant to cases not involving such conduct. Some courts have addressed this problem by holding that another statute, the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"), creates a private right of action. This statute, which was enacted in 1789 as part of the first Judiciary Act, states that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' There are many reasons to question the conclusion that this statute creates a cause of action, including the statute's plain language, which is phrased in purely jurisdictional terms; the historical context in which the statute was enacted, which long predated modern notions of both international human rights law and federal common law; and the failure of any court to read it this way for approximately two hundred years.' In addition, reading the ATS as creating a cause of action would mean that claims could be brought under non-self-executing treaties, since the statute refers not only to the law of nations but also to treaties of the United States. It is wellsettled in US law, however, that individuals do not have the right to sue under nonself-executing treaties.' While Congress can certainly enact legislation implementing a non-self-executing treaty, it would be difficult to construe the ATS as implementing non-self-executing treaties ratified hundreds of years after the ATS's enactment.
In any event, the ATS has a major limitation built into its scope: it applies only to suits by alien plaintiffs and thus cannot be relied upon to create a right to sue in cases brought by US plaintiffs. As noted, most of the initial cases brought under the Filartiga precedent were alien-against-alien suits. In recent years, however, a number of international human rights suits have been brought against domestic defendants. This "second wave" litigation can itself be divided into two categories: suits by alien plaintiffs and suits by domestic plaintiffs. Although the ATS can potentially be invoked in the first category of second wave cases, the plaintiffs in those cases often have encountered other barriers to suit. Plaintiffs have encountered even greater difficulties in the second category of second wave cases. In those cases, plaintiffs cannot rely on the ATS, so they must look elsewhere for their cause of action. 
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III. CATEGORY A: SUITS BY ALIEN PLAINTIFFS
There have been a number of cases in recent years in which alien plaintiffs have sued domestic defendants for violations of international human rights law, including several cases brought against US corporations. In this category of second wave cases, the plaintiffs can invoke the Alien Tort Statute, which, as noted above, has been held by some courts not only to confer statutory jurisdiction but also to create a cause of action. One might assume, therefore, that these suits would be as successful as the alien-versus-alien cases described above. In fact, with rare exceptions,2 these suits have failed.
These suits have encountered a variety of doctrinal and procedural barriers. As in first wave litigation, the plaintiffs are generally disallowed in these cases from bringing claims directly under human rights treaties because the United States either has not ratified them or has declared them to be non-self-executing. In addition, courts have held that customary international law cannot be applied by US courts when there is a controlling executive or legislative act to the contrary." Courts also have been strict about the requirements for pleading and proving the international law violations. Furthermore, they have applied domestic law restrictions, such as statutes of limitation and the act of state doctrine, to bar the international law claims. 3 In sum, although there are a variety of specific reasons why courts have rejected claims in this context, it appears that, in general, courts are more resistant to allowing international human rights claims when they are brought against domestic defendants. As discussed below, this resistance has been most pronounced when the suits have been brought by domestic plaintiffs. In that context, Judge Bork's arguments in Te-Oren-although they have had little purchase in first wave litigation-are proving to be influential. (1804) (stating that "an act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains"). 5 Because the plaintiffs in these cases were not aliens, they could not invoke the ATS as a basis for their cause of action. And, in each of these cases, courts have held that there is no private right of action under customary international law. In other words, they have in effect accepted Judge Bork's argument in Tel-Oren. These courts have offered several reasons for their conclusion.
First, the Supreme Court has held that private rights of action should not be implied under domestic law when there are "special factors counseling hesitation"-for example, if the right of action issue raises difficult policy questions best left for Congress in the first instance.' Courts have reasoned that, if anything, this separation of powers concern is higher with respect to cases involving international law issues, since foreign affairs matters are particularly the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. It is these branches, the courts have said, that should determine how international law should be enforced within the United States. As one court explained (and other courts have quoted), "To imply a cause of action from the law of nations would completely defeat the critical right of the sovereign to determine whether and how international rights should be enforced in that municipality."' Second, courts have noted that there are extensive domestic remedies available for abusive actions by federal and state officials-such as the remedies available under the civil rights statute, 42 USC § 1983; under the Federal Tort Claims Act; and under state tort law. Indeed, US officials have themselves referred to these remedies as a reason for not enacting legislation to implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). Such domestic remedies similarly reduce the need, courts have reasoned, for implying private rights of action under customary international law.
Third, courts have reasoned that Congress already looked at the issue of a right to sue under customary international law when it enacted the TVPA, and it codified Fall 2000 • Bradey only torture and extrajudicial killing, not other customary international law claims. By implication, the courts have said, Congress has not approved private rights of action under other customary international law claims. As one court explained, "the fact that the relief authorized by Congress is not coextensive with the right at issue does not mean this Court should not show deference to Congress's balancing of the policy considerations underlying its action."
Fourth, courts have sought to avoid allowing litigants to circumvent limitations imposed by the US treatymakers. Many of the customary international law rights asserted in US courts are also reflected in human rights treaties, either because the treaties codified customary international law or because the customary international law has been derived in part from the treaties. To the extent that the United States has ratified these treaties, it has consistently declared their substantive provisions to be non-self-executing-that is, not enforceable in court unless and until Congress passes implementing legislation.40 As a result, courts consistently have disallowed private claims under these treaties. 4 If courts concluded that customary international law conferred a private right of action, litigants would be able to do an end run around this case law and, more importantly, the actions of the US treatymakers.
In my view, these arguments against implied rights of action under customary international human rights law are persuasive. I would add one additional, somewhat technical argument: the lack of a private right of action under customary international law helps explain why almost no court has allowed customary international law to serve as the basis for jurisdiction under the general federal question jurisdiction statute. 42 As noted above, courts have said that customary international law has the status of federal common law. In addition, the Supreme Court has held that claims arising under federal common law can fall within the 'laws... of the United States" referred to in the federal question jurisdiction statute. 43 Yet almost no court has based its jurisdiction over customary international law claims on this statute; instead, they In sum, there have been two waves of international human rights litigation. The first wave, inspired by Filartiga, has involved suits between aliens concerning conduct outside the United States. This litigation has been moderately successful. The second, more recent wave has involved suits against US defendants. This wave has been extremely unsuccessful, especially when the plaintiffs have been US citizens. These conflicting results may not sit well together. Among other things, it is likely to seem anomalous to courts that alien plaintiffs have substantially greater rights than domestic plaintiffs to invoke international law in the United States-and to utilize the resources of the backlogged federal court system-just as it seemed anomalous to Congress when it enacted the TVPA. In addition, some of the reasons courts are giving for rejecting an implied right of action in cases brought under the second wave, such as the desirability of leaving these issues for Congress in the first instance, the negative implications of the TVPA, and the concerns about litigants doing an endrun around the actions of the US treatymakers, are also reasons to question the allowance of cases under the first wave.' Thus, ironically, by bringing international human rights litigation "home," its proponents may in fact be undermining it. 
